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To restore growth in highly indebted countries, debt reduction
alone is not as efficient as simultaneously providing liquidity,
debt reduction,  and  possibly conditionality.  Indeed, many
countries might not need debt reduction if liquidity and condi-
tionality were available.
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Debt  and International  Finance
Six years into the debt crisis, questions about the  Debt reductijn alone, they argue, is not as
relevance of policy measures to alleviate the  efficient as simultaneously providing liquidity
crisis still abound. Conditionality by intema-  and debt reduction. Indeed, many countries
tional financial institutions and rescheduling by  might not riced debt reduction if liquidity were
commercial creditors have been dismissed in  available.
favor of debt reduction as strategies for restoring
the creditworthiness of heavily indebted coun-  Conditionality produces efficiency gains by
tries,  reducing creditor concerns thb 1 !'e debtor
countries will "cheat" on their promises to adjust
Claessens and Diwan argue that the combi-  and invest.  This reduced concern induces
nation of conditionality and new private money  creditors to provide new loans and reduce the
- if properly interpreted and correctly imple-  debtor's liquidity constraints.  Increased invest-
mented - should not be dismissed too lightly.  ment produces efficiency gains that can then be
They contend that liquidity (the availability of  distributed between debtors and creditors,
current resources) in the debtor country is  reducing the need for debt relief.
probably as important an incentive for a country
to invest and adjust as having a small enough  The combination of new money and condi-
debt stock outstanding.  tionality will work if the debt siock is small
enough and enough new money is available.
This paper, prepared for the conference "Dealing with the Debt Crisis," is a
producL  of the Debt and International Finance Division, International Economics
Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433. Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room S7-033,
extension 33730 (46 pages with charts).
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CONDITIONALITY AND DEBT RELIEF
1. Introduction
Six  years  into  the  debt  crisis,  questions  about  the  relevance  of
policy  measures  to  alleviate  the  crisis  still  abound.  The  present
state  of  affairs  is  often  described  as inefficient  in the  sense  that
potential  efficiency  geins  which  can  lead  to  benefits  for  all  parties
involved  exist  but  policies  to  achieve  these  gains  are  not  being
implemented.  In  particular,  economic  projects  with  a rate  of return
larger  than  the  world  interest  rate  are  not  undertaken  in  debtor
countries.  The  present  situation  can in  effect  be,viewed  as the
inefficient  outcome  of a prisoner's  dilemma  game:  certain  coordinated
acts  of creditors  and  debtors  can  therefore  improve  both  their
welfare.
In general,  inefficiencies  in this  context  are  due to  one (or  a
combination)  of the  three  following  factors:  (i)  coordination  failures
within  each  party  coalition;  (ii)  the  negotiating  and  bargaining
process  between  the  parties;  and (iii)  the  lack  of credible  mechanisms
that  could  be used  to alleviate  time-inconsistency  problems.  The first
factor  is fairly  well  understood:  on the  creditors  side,  the  main
problem  derives  from  the  difficulty  of  privately  financing  a public
good (the  so called  "free-rider  problem):  on the  debtor  side,  the
difficulty  for  the  government  consists  of  undertaking  efficient
measures  that  may  hurt  some  constituency  and  benefit  others  (either
because  of lacking  redistributive  instruments  or strong  pressures  from
individual  ccnstituencies).  We will  not  discuss  this  first  factor
1iere.-4-
The second  factor  refers  to the  perverse  incentive  effect  of a
large  debt  outstanding  on the  willingness  of the  country  to  adjust  and
invest  and  on the  willingness  of the  creditors  to  provide  new
financing.  Without  an injection  of liquidity,  additional  investment  is
costly  to the  debtor  as current  consumption  will  have to  be reduced,
an unattractive  alternative  after  six  years  of austerity  that  has
lowered  (for  some  countries)  per  capita  consumption  (and  income)  to
levels  below  those  of the  early  eighties.'  Moreover,  given  the  nature
of the  bargaining  and  negotiating  process,  the  future  benefits  of
austerity  and  investment  will  be shared  between  the  debtor  and the
creditors,  with  a larger  share  of the  benefits  going  to the  creditors
the  more  indebted  the  country  is.  This  reduces  the  incentives  for  the
country  to adjust  its  investment/saving  decisions  in  a  way that  is
more  compatible  with their  foreign  obligations.  At issue  is thus  the
way  in  which  the  current  costs  and  the  future  benefits  of additional
investment  will  be divided  between  the  debtor  and  creditors,  in the
form  of  provision  of current  liquidity  and  future  debt  repayment,  and
whether  more efficient  sharing  mechanisms  can  be designed  in order  to
exploit  existing  growth  opportunities  and  achieve  a  higher  growth
equilibrium.
If  however,  creditors  are  not  willing  to  share  in the  costs  of
new  domestic  investments  by extending  new loans  (or  providing  any
other  form  of liquidity  relief)  and/or  are  rnot  willing  (or  able)  to
precommit  themselves  to  reduce  their  share  of the  future  returns  on
1 In this  context,  investment  should  be interpreted  broadly  to include
structural  economic  reforms  of the  debtor's  country  productive
resources  and  all  other  policies  that  requires  an expense  of current
resources  in  return  for  higher  consumption  in  the  future.  Investment
could  thus  include  policies  of industrial  reorganization,  trade
liberalization,  financial  sector  reforms,  public  enterprises
restructuring,  as  well as fiscal  reforms.-5-
the  investment  (i.e.,  write  off  some  of their  claims),  the (net)
marginal  return  on additional  investment  will likely  be too  low  for
the  debtor  to  justify  the  required  current  expense.  Debtors  would  then
be unwilling  to  undertake  high investment  levels.  At the  same  time,
its  creditors  will  not  be  willing  to  extend  new loans  or to reduce
their  share  of future  output  unless  the  debtor  is  able  and  willing  to
precommit  itself  to increase  investment,  as the  moral  hazard  risk  of
the  new  resources  largely  going  to  current  consumption,  instead  of to
investment,  will  be too  large.  Inefficient  behavior  from  both the
creditors  and  the  debtor  can  then  rationally  co-exist  as the  outcome
of this  prisoner's  dilema.  The result  is  a low  growth  but time
consistent  equilibrium.  Creditors  will  try  to  grab  as  much as  possible
of current  resources  and  the  debtor  will  underinvest  in  an effort  to
reduce  future  repayments.  Both  would  be  better  off  with  more efficient
contracts:  smaller  current  net transfers  and  higher  investment  levels,
and  a different  sharing  of output  in  the  future.
This  paper  will  discuss  the  nature  of the  efficiency  gains  that
can  be obtained  and  analyze  the  limits  that  moral  hazard  and time
consistency  problems  impose  on the  feasible  efficient  allocations.  The
main  focus  of the  paper  will  be to  look  at the  additional  efficiency
gains  due  to the  existence  of a precommitment  technology.  The  paper
will  analyze  how  efficient  high  growth  equilibria  can  be achieved
through  the  use  of a precommitment  technology  for  investments.
Allowing  for  investment  precommitments  results  in  equilibria  which
Pareto  dominate  time  consistent  equilibria.  The  efficiency  gains  arise
from  the  possibility  of attracting  more  capital  to invest  in
productive  projects,  leading  to  gains  which  can  be distributed  such
that  both  parties  at least  as well  off  as in  the  stattwquo, low-
growth  equilibrium.-6-
The  analysis  yields  important  policy  implications,  with
particular  important  interpretatLons  for  the  concepts  of
conditionality  and  debt  relief. The  paper  shows  that  debtors  that
have lost  their  credit-worthiness  fall  in two  broad  categories:  those
that  experience  a  weak debt  overhang  and  those  that  are  in a strong
debt  overhang.  In  cases  of  weak  debt  overhang,  new  loans  and
precommitments  on investment  can  be sufficient  to restore  credit-
worthiness  and  achieve  a  high  growth  equilibrium.  However,  in cases  of
strong  debt  overhang  debt  relief  is  also  needed.  In this  latter  case,
the  third  party,  e.g.,  multilateral  institutions,  should  refuse  to
provide  the  precommitment  technology  unless  a portion  of the
outstanding  debt  is  written  off.  Otherwise,  new (conditional)  loans
cannot  lead  to a restoration  of credit-worthiness.  The important
problem  the  precommitment  technology  raises  for  the  third  party  (e.g.,
the  multilateral)  is  how the  efficiency  gains  will  be distributed
between  the  creditors  and  the  debtor.  Besides  strategic  concerns,  the
existence  of externalities  can  influence  the  choice  of the
multilateral.
The  paper  is  structured  as follows:  in section  2,  we set  up a
simple  model  that  captures  the  interactions  between  the  debtor  cointry
and  creditors  without  precommitments,  and  we study  the  optimal  actions
between  creditors  and  the  debtor  country.  In  section  3,  we study  the
optimal  actions  of the  debtor  country  and  the  creditors  under  the
assumption  of an effective  precommitment  technology  provided  by a
third  party.  §Wti-  4 provides  an interpretation  of the  precommitment
technology  in  terms  of  multilateral  lending  and  draws  implications  for
the  way in  which  multilaterals  operate.  This  section  also  discusses
the  importance  of  externalities  involved  in situations  of a debt
overhang  and  their  effect  on the  way  the  multilateral  uses  its
precommitment  technology  for  the  benefit  of the  debtor  or creditors.-7.-
Section  5  concludes  by outlining  important  extensions  and  further
rt
research  topics.-8-
2.  Eguilibria  Without  A  Pecommitment  Mechanism
We start  our  analysis  by ignoring  precommitment  possibilities.
The  investment  decision  is  then  determined  by the  debtor  after  nei0
loans  have  been  disbursed,  i.e.,  in  an ex-post  optimal  fashion.  The
focus  is on the (standard)  inefficiencies  of  a large  external  debt
which  debtor  and  creditors  will try  to overcome  by making  offers  to
each  other  and,  potentially,  bargaining  over  these  offers.  The  lack  of
precommicment  mechanism  restricts  the  resulting  allocations  to  be at
best  Pareto  efficient  in  a constrained  sense.  How further  improvements
can  be secured  using  a precommitment  technolugy  is  discussed  in
section  3.
2.1  A  SiMple  Model
In order  to  highlight  the  effect  of debt  policy  on the  efficiency
of the  intertemporal  allocation  in the  debtor  country,  the  analysis  is
cast in  terms  of a simple  two  pe.iod,  certainty  model.  We consider  a
small,  one  good,  open  economy  close  in  spirit  to the  economies  of
Krugman  (1987),  Froot  (1988),  Corden  (1988)  and  Sachs  (1988).  The
country  is  each  period  endowed  with  an exogenous  supply  of a good,
which  can  be used  for  consumption,  repayment  of loans  or investment.
The  country  is  a  pricetaker  in  the  international  goods  and  credits
markets  and  has an inherited  stock  of foreigr.  debt  with  an implied
obligation  of D.,
The  country  is  governed  by a  central  planner,  who  maximizes  a
welfare  function  subject  to resource  constraints.  Decisions  must  be
made  regarding  new  external  borrowing  and  the  allocation  of current
resources  between  domestic  investment,  consumption  and  external  debt
repayment.  The  timing  of the  decisions  is as iollows:  in  the  first
period  the  planner  may  borrow  abroad  subject  to supply  constraints;-9-
the  available  resources  are  then  divided  by the  debtor  country  between
investment  and  consumption;  in the  second  period,  the  country  makes
transfers  to the  creditors  from  its  endowment  and  the  return  on its
first  period  investment,  and  consumes  the  remaining  resources.
2 It is
assumed  that  the  creditors  have  a "gunboat"  technology  for  capturing
all  of the  country's  second  period  resources  in  case  output  falls
short  of the  amount  of debt  service  due  and  the  country  defaults.
3
The economy  can  be represented  by the  following  five  equations:
(1)  W  - U(Cd)+bC 2
(2) C 1 - E+L-I
(3)  C2 - E+f(I)-R
(4) R  - min[E+f(i),D]
(5)  P  -R-L
where  E is the  country's  endowment  of the  good  in  each  period;  C.
refers  to aggregate  consumption  in  period  i-1,2;  I  denotes  the
investment  level;  f(I)  the  return  on investment  in  the  second  period
with f'>O  and  f''<O;  L is  the  amouant  of resources  (liquidity)  lent  in
period  one;  and  D is  the  required  repayment  in t-2  (which  includes  the
repayment  on loan  L).  The  actual  repayment  next  period  is given  by R.
The  debtor's  welfare  is  given  by equation  (1):  U(C 1) is  a first  period
utility  function  which  satisfies  the  usual  concavity  and  Inada
conditions  and  b is  the  country's  discount  factor.  For  analytical
convenience,  second  period  utility  is chosen  to  be linear.4  We assume
2  The  results  of the  model  would  not  change  if it  was assumed  that  the
country  also  transfers  an amount  of resources  to the  creditors  in the
first  period,  as long  as that  amount  is  independent  of its  investment
decision.
3  Assuming  that  the  creditors  can  only  obtain  part  of the  country's
resources  in  event  of a default  does  not  change  the  major  conclusions
of the  analysis,  but drastically  complicates  the  algebra.
' This  avoids  having  to deal  with  risksharing  considerations.  The-10-
that  the  world  interest  rate  is  zero  for  analytical  convenience.  To
reflect  the  relative  scarcity  of capital  in  the  debtor's  country,  the
country's  discount  factor  is  assumed  to  be below  the  world's  discount
rate,  i.e.,  b<l.  The  creditors  net  payoff,  equation  (5),  is the
difference  between  the  amount  actually  repaid  next  period  and the
amount  of resources  lent  this  period:  the  amount  of debt  outstanding,
Do  is  considered  a sunk  cost.
2.2  Anefficient  Investment
There  is room  for  Pareto-improvement  if,  due  to the  large  deb,
overhang,  the  country  is  not  undertaking  investment  opportunities
which,  evaluated  at the  world's  interest  rate,  are  profitable  in
themselves. 5 Th  model  incorporates  two  broad  factors  that  generate
incentives  to  underinvest.  LCe  scarcity  of liquidity  and  the  attempt
to  evade  future  debt  repayments.6
A. Liquidity  Considerations
The  opportunity  cost  of  current  investment  -in  terms  of forgone
current  consumption-  increases  with  the  scarcity  of current  resources.
As a result,  the  country's  effective  rate  of time  preference  becomes
larger  than  the  world  interest  rate,  rendering  investment
opportunities  that  are  valuable  by international  standards
gualitative  outcomes  of the  model  e  i  not  affected,  however.
In  other  words,  there  is  underin  fi  tment  when f'(I)>l.
6  Other  effects  of a debt  overhang  will  not  be analyzed  here.  For
example,  the  temptation  to  chose  riskier  projects  in a go-for-broke
strategy  has  been  well  described  in  the  corporate  finance  literature.
In  a go-for-broke  strategy  the  country  can  make investments  worthwhile
if they  are  risky  enough  and  pay  off  sufficiently  in  good  states  of
nature  to pay  back the  creditors  and  yield  some  return  to the  debtor.
The  outcome  in  bad states  of  nature  is  of less  interest  to the  debtor
as all  or  part  of the  rewards  will  go to the  creditors  anyway.-11-
unattractive. 7 New  foreign  lenders  will  not  finance  these  profitable
investment  opportunities  when the  line  of  e:cisting  external  creditors
is  already  too  long.  But,  existing  foreign  creditors  might  want to
finance  new investments  in  order  to increase  the  size  of the  economic
pie to  be divided  rnext  period  between  them  and  the  country  as long  as
they  are  assure,  that  (part  of)  their  new  loans  will  be used  for
investment.  However,  the  country  decides  after  having  received  the  new
loans  how to  divide  its  resources  between  optimally  between  investment
and  consumption.  The  ex-post  tradeoff  of the  country  will  lead  the
country  to invest  less  than  the  amount  of the  loan  provided.  The
creditors  will  take _he  debtor's  ex-post  tradeoff  into  account  in
making  their  ex-ante  decisio-i  regarding  new  loans.  This time
consistency,  or ex-ante  ver'.us  ex-post,  problem  is  exacerbated  if the
debtor  is liquidity  constrained  and,  after  receiving  new  loans,  is
unwilling  to  sacrifice  consumption  to  undertake  all  profitable
investment  projects.
To illustrate  this  relationship  between  investment  and  liquidity,
we solve  for  the  country's  investment  problem  given  an amount  of
liquidity  L  and  assume  for  the  moment  that  the  large  contractual  debt
repayment  next  period  does  not  constitute  a disincentive  to invest.
The  maximization  of  welfare,  (1),  subject  to (2)  and (3),  implies  that
I* is  an implicit  function  of liquidity,  L,  which  satisfies:
(6)  f'(I*) - U'(E+L-I*)/b.
7  The  liquidity  constraint  is  a reflection  of the  relative  scarcity  of
resources  in  the  debtor  country.  It is  specially  meaningful  in  highly
indebted  countries  where  real  income  has declined  markedly  in the
recent  past.  In this  regard,  it  is  worth  pointing  to  the  fact  that
capital  accumulated  abroad  by the  private  sector  (capital  flight)  does
not  provide  the  public  sector  with  resources  it  can tap.  Thus,  public
investment  could  well  be constrained  by liquidity  considerations  even
when  a segment  of the  private  sector  has  accumulated  reserves  abroad.-12-
When the  debtor  is  liquidity  constrained,  he will  be unable  to
reduce  U' to the  level  of  his  discount  factor  b and  equate  his
intertemporal  marginal  rate  of subrtitution  for  consumption  to the
world  interest  rate,  1.  The  marginal  return  on investment,  f',  will
exceed  1 in this  situation  and  valuable  investment  opportunities  will
therefore  be foregone.  An increase  in liquidity  L  would,  of course,
release  the  liquidity  constraint  and  would  increase  I* as  part  of the
new  resources  would  be invested. 8
B. The  Tax Effect  Of  A Large  Debt
When  the  amount  of forpign  debt  outstanding  Do  is  large  enough,
the  associated  future  repayment  obligation  can  act  as  a disincentive
on investment  as a share  of the  gross  return  on investment  can  go to
the  creditors  and  not  ttu  the  country.  This  has  been  called  the  tax
effect  of a large  debt. 9 The "gunboat"  technology  in  the  model
highlights  this  effect.  When the  future  debt  obligation  D is large
enough,  the  debtor  can  expect  that  all  of its  future  resources  will  be
seized  by its  creditors.  It then  becomes  rational  for  the  country  to
consume  all  current  resources  ar.4  to invest  none.  This  occurs  when
(using  equation  (6)  and  assuming  rational  expectations)  D is large
enough  to  make  welfare  with investment  I*(L)  and  debt  repayment  D,
i.e.,  W - U(E-I*(L)+L)+b(E+f(I*(L))-(D)),  lower  than  welfare  under  no
investment  and  default,  i.e.,  utility  level  U(E+L).
a  It is easy to show that 0  < dI*/dL=UID/(U'+bf'')  < 1.
9Sachs  (1988)  has first  analyzed  the  effects  of a  debt  overhang  this
way.  The  tax  effect  can  operate  either  on the  incentives  of a central
planner  governing  a country  or, in  the  context  of  a market  economy
with  a large  public  debt,  on the  investment  incentives  of the  private
sector.  In the  later  case,  the  investment  disincentives  arise  from  the
expectation  of the  increased  future  taxation  that  is  necessary  to
operate  a transfer  from  the  private  sector  to the  public  sector.-13-
Summarizing,  the  debtor  country  will  choose  to invest  I*(L)  and
repay  D  when the  debt  outstanding  satisfies:
(7)  D 59  E+f(I*(L))-[U(E+L)/b] + [U(E-I*(L)+L)/b]-V8x(L,I*(Q))
As I* is a function  of L one  can  write  DP(L,I*(L)) as an
(implicit)  function  of  L alone,  i.e.,  D'"(L).  In  effect,  De(L)  is
the  maximum  amount  that  creditors  will  be able  to receive  from  the
country  if  they  provide  new  loans  in the  amount  L. If  creditors  asked
for  more,  the  debtor  would  prefer  not to invest  and  to  repay  next
period  only  E. This  would  imply  that  creditors  would  end  up getting
less  than  Dm.  However,  when  the  creditors  asks  for  less  than  Dm,  or
outstanding  debt  is  below  D¶a, the  debtor  will invest  I* in  an ex-
post  optimal  fashion  and  repay  its  full  amount.  If the  inherited  debt
exceeds  Dm" a  write  off  of the  old  debt  to the  maximum  level,  Dm(L)
will increase  the  debt  repayment  and  the  economic  pie.
It is easy  to  check  that  Dig is  an increasing  function  of L.  As
the  availability  of larger  current  resources  increases,  this
encourages  investment  which  then  increases  the  amount  that  can  be
extracted  from  the  debtor.
The important  implication  of the  dual  liquidity  and  tax  effect  on
investment  is  that,  in  general,  the  incentive  for  investment  will
depend  on the  amount  of liquidity  as  well as  on the  amount  of debt  to
be repaid  next  period.  For  efficiency  gains,  the  optimal  provision  of
incentives  to repay  will  therefore  have  to  be a  mixture  of liquidity
relief  and  debt  write-offs.' 0 We  will concentrate  in the  remainder  of
10 See  Froot  (1988)  for  an  elaboration.-14-
the  paper  on the  case  where  inherited  debt  Do  is  larger  than  the
maximum  amount  creditors  can  expect  to  receive  without  an amount  of
new liquidity,  Dm"(O).1l  In this  circumstance,  the  debtor  will  not
invest  unless  (part  of)  his  obligation  is  written-off  and/or  he is
granted  some  liquidity  relief.
2.3  Pareto  Efficient  Allocations  Without  Precommitments
The status-quo  of  no write-offs  and  no fresh  liquidity  produces  a
utility  level  of  W0-U(E)  for  the  country  and  a  payoff  of P.-E  for  the
creditors.  The  debtor  and  its  creditors  can  now  exchange  offers  about
(L,D),  the  amount  of period  one  liquidity  and  the  level  of future
repayment,  to improve  upon the  status-quo. 1 2 Of course,  we restrict
all  offers  (D,L)  to  be time  consistent.  This  implies  that  if  an amount
of liquidity  L is  advanced  in  period  one,  an amount  I*(L)  is  expected
to  be,  and  will  be, invested  by the  country.  Subsequently,  an amount
D*,  consistent  with  the  "gunboat"  technology  of the  creditors  and  the
debtor's  tradeoffs,  will  be paid  back in  period  two.  This imposes  two
constraints:  (i)  the  debtor  is  best  off  investing  after  receiving  the
loan,  i.e.,  equation  (7)  holds;  and (ii)  the  debtor  cannot  be  better
off  after  investing  not repaying  D  and  having  its  output  seized,  i.e,
[E+f(I)]"D.  As it  turns  out, the  latter  constraint  is  always  satisfied
when  constraint  (7)  holds,  so only  constraint  (7)  is  necessary.
A. The  Debtor's  Optimal  Take-It-Or-Leave-It  Offer
11  With rational  expectations,  competitive  lenders  will actually  lend
voluntarily  until  the  debtor  obligation  reaches  the  credit  ceiling
Dmax.  Under  uncertainty,  large  negative  shocks  that  raised  the  burden
of the  debt  relative  to the  credit  ceiling  (interest  rate  and  exchange
rate  shocks,  productivity  and  terms  of trade  shocks)  could  cause
outstanding  foreign  debt  to  exceed  Dmax.
12  When a  commitment  technology  is  used,  the  offers  will also
condition  investment  and  take  the  form  of a triplet  (I,L,D).  See
further  section  3.-15-
To improve  its  welfare  level  beyond  the  status-quo  utility  level,
WOO  the  debtor  would  want  the  creditors  to lend  more  today  (in  order
to reduce  the  liquidity  constraint)  and  to  commit  themselves  to reduce
their  share  of future  output  (in  order  to  eliminate  the  tax  effect).
In return,  the  debtor  would  be willing  to invest  more  and  repay  a
larger  amount  next  period.  Its  preferred  unilateral  offer  of liquidity
and  repayment  levels  (D*,L*)  must  satisfy  the  time  consistency
constraint  (7)  and  it  must  leave  the  creditors  no  worse  off  than  under
the  status-quo  situation.  In  other  words,  it  must,  apart  from (7),
also  satisfy:
(8)  P-D-L  > Po-E.
The  optimization  problem  for  the  debtor  becomes  then:
Max  W-U(E-I*(L)+L)+b[E+f(I*(L))-D]
D,L
subject  to equations  (7)  and (8).
The  problem  is illustrated  in  figure  1 in (D,L)  space.  The
welfare  function  of the  country  results  in indifference  curves  which
slope  north-east.  The  creditors'  indifference  curves  consist  of 45
degree  lines,  such  as lines  (8),  with  the  intersection  of the  lines
with the  vertical  axis  representing  the  net  payoff  P.  The  maximization
of the  debtors's  welfare  will imply  the  minimization  of the  creditors'
net return  P  and therefore  the  constraint  in  equation  (8)  will  always
be binding.  The  debtor  will thus  choose  its  preferred  point  on the
line  marked  (8)  and  will further  be constrained  by equation  (7),
represented  by line  (7).  Assuming  that  the  debtor  has a relative
preference  for  liquidity,  it  will  then  prefer  increases  in  L over-16-
reductions  in D, and  would  want to  move  north-east  along  line  (8).  In
that  case,  the  maximal  liquidity  will  be obtained  at point  B, a corner
solution  where  the  time  consistency  equation  (7)  will  also  be binding.
Point  A could  lead  to  a higher  utility  because  of the  greater
liquidity  but is  not feasible  because  it  violates  the  time  consistency
constraint  (7).  If the  preference  for  liquidity  is  however  not  as
great  as assumed,  an  optimal  offer  could  be for  example  C.
If  the  offer  (D*,L*)  is  accepted  by the  creditors,  the  resulting
allocation  would  differ  from  the  status-quo  allocation  (E,O)  in the
following  ways:  the  creditors  would  provide  liquidity  relief  to the
amount  of L* and  would  write-off  the  outstanding  debt  from  DO to D*.
Their  total  payoff  would  be unchanged,  as  more  would  be collected  in
the  future  to offset  the  new  loan  L*, i.e.,  D*-E+L*.  The  debtor
accepts  to adjust  by investing  more,  and  by possibly  imposing
austerity,  today  in  return  for  debt  relief  tomorrow,  and  is  better  off
given  his relative  preferences  for  liquidity.
However,  the  time  consistency  constraint  (7)  will  still  limit  the
allocations  and  will  not  allow  a fully  realized  investment
potential." The liquidity  constraint  will  bind and  the  debtor  will
want  to increase  L if  he could.  In  order  to leave  the  creditors  as
well  off,  this  would  imply  an increase  in the  promised  repayment  D,
which,  however,  will  not  be credible  as the  debtor  will  be better  off,
after  receiving  the  loan,  not investing  at all.  Although  additional
funds  could  be very  productive  if invested,  they  will not  be
forthcoming  because,  once  new  loans  have  been  disbursed,  the  country
13  In  other  words,  U'(E+L*-I*)>b  and  therefore  (using  6) f'(I*)>l.  If
the  debtor  is currently  not  too  liquidity  constrained,  equation  (7)
will  not  be binding  and  U'-b,  f'(I*)-l  (such  as point  C  on figure  1).
But  for  offers  that  give  the  creditors  some larger  payoff  P  equation
(7)  will  be binding  and  not all  profitable  investment  opportunities
will  be realized.-17-
has  little  incentives  to invest  given  the  amount  of  outstanding  debt
obligations.  Additional  loans  could  be secured  and  larger  efficiency
improvements  could  be unlocked  if the  debtor  could  credibly  bear a
larger  debt  burden,  by, for  example,  committing  to  a certain  level  of
investment.
B. The  Creditors'  Optimal  Take-It-Or-Leave-It  Offers
The  creditors,  acting  as a coalition,  can  construct  a unilateral
oiter  in terms  of (L,D),  i.e.,  an amount  of liquidity,  L, and  a
required  repayment  next  period  of  D, which  can  increase  their  net
return,  P-D-L,  and  leave  the  debtor  at an as low  as possible  welfare
level.  The  provision  of liquidity  L can increase  the  creditors'  net
payoff  as the  debtor  will invest  a fraction  of the  new  resources,
which  can  lead  to a sufficient  increase  in  next  period's  output,  part
of which  output  will  be available  for  debt  service. 14
In  choosing  their  optimal  offer,  (L*,D*),  the  creditors  must
anticipate  the  investment  reaction  of the  debtor.  As before,  this  is
given  by the  implicit  function  I*(L)  that  satisfies  equation  (6).  The
offer  includes  a reduction  of the  debt  obligation  in  order  to induce
the  debtor  to invest  I* (i.e.,  constraint  (7)  holds).  Since  the  best
offer  actually  leaves  the  debtor  indifferent  between  investing  and  not
investing,  (7)  will  be binding  and  will  hold  as an equality,  i.e.,
D*-D m x(L*),  resulting  in  an (implicit)  function  for  D* in terms  of
L*. In terms  of figure  1, the  creditors  will  choose  their  preferred
offer  along  the  line  corresponding  to  function  (7),  with their
indifference  curves  being  45 degree  lines  and  an increase  in  payoffs
14  This  part  of the  model  is identical  to  the  case  discussed  by Froot
(1988).-18-
represented  by a movement  ixorth-west.
Taken  into  account  that  constraint  (7)  is  binding,  the  optimal
choice  (D*,L*)  maximizes  P-D(L)-L  with  respect  to  L. The  optimal
amount  of first  period  loans  solves  the  first  order  condition:
(9)  0 - [U'(E+L*-I*)/b]-[U'(E+L*)/b]-l  - f'(I*)-[U'(E+L*)/b]-l
in  which  equation  (6)  is  used.  This  equation  solves,  in  an implicit
manner,  for  L*.  In turn,  equation  (6)  solves  for  I*  and  equality  (7)
for  D*.  The  solution  is  represented  as point  F  on figure  1. The
creditors'  offer  will imply  a lower  repayment  in  period  two  compared
to  what  the  debtor  would  have  offered  in  his own  unilateral  offer  and
a lower  offer  in  period  one  of liquidity,  but a  higher  net  return
(Y>E).
Investment  I*  will  be above  the  status-quo  investment,  I=0,  which
gives  rise  to the  Pareto  improvement.  The  creditors'  payoff  is
increased  from  Po-E  to P*-D*-L*-Y  and  the  debtor's  welfare  is
increased  from  W0-U(E)  to  W*=U(E+L*). Interestingly,  creditors  need
to  share  the  efficiency  gains  from  increased  investment  with the
debtor  in  order  not to induce  the  debtor  to default  after  receiving
the  new  loan.
From (9)  we know that  f'(I*)>l,  implying  that  not  all  profitable
investment  opportunities  in  the  country  will  be undertaken  as  L* will
not  be large  enough  to  release  the  liquidity  constraint.  Releasing  the
liquidity  constraint  is  not  a  profitable  strategy  for  the  creditors  as
only  a portion  of these  resources  will  be invested.  As a result,  the
amount  of collectable  repayment,  D(L),  will  not  rise  enough  to  justify
any  additional  loans.  This  is  a reflection  once  more  of the  time-19-
consistency  problem  and  shows  that  further  Pareto  improvements  could
be secured  if  precommitments  on investments  were  possible.
2.4  The  Set  Of Efficient  Allocations  Without  Precommitments
In a similar  manner,  it  is  possible  to generate  all  the  feasible
and  efficient  debtor's  and  creditors'  unilateral  offers  that  leave  the
other  party  at some  other  level  of reservation  utility.  In figure  1,
this  set  of  possible  Pareto  improving  allocations  is  represented  by
the  curve  FB:  the  creditors  will  want to  be as  close  as possible  to F
while  the  debtor  will  prefer  to  be as close  as  possible  to  B.
Interestingly,  the  higher  the  utility  level  of the  debtor,  the  higher
the  investment  level.  This is  because  the  debtor  will  try  to get  as
much  liquidity  as possible,  increasing  its  ex-post  incentives  to
invest.  15 On the other hand, the creditors will want to reduce future
debt  obligations  as little  as  possible,  implying  lower  levels  of new
liquidity  and  thus  lower  levels  of investment.
This  concept  of bargaining  over  allocations  has  in reality  been
implemented  through  combinations  of liquidity  relief  and  debt  relief
occurring  in the  form  of (multiyear)  reschedulings  with  reduced  terms
(lower  spreads).  Creditors  and  the  debtor  bargain  over  the  terms  and
conditions  of the  rescheduling  with implicitly  in  mind  a division  of
the  gains  of the  additional  investments  as  a result  of the
rescheduling.
15  Assuming  the  debtor  always  remains  liquidity  constrained.-20-
3.  Tbh  Effect  Of The  Precommitment  TechnologX
A technology  which  allows  the  debtor  country  to precommit  itself
to an investment  level  can  lead  to  overall  efficiency  gains  as it can
overcome  the  time  inconsistency  problem.  The  analysis  above  revealed
that  this  problem  was  more  important  the  more liquidity  constrained
the  debtor  was as the  debtor  would  be even  less  inclined  to invest  any
new resources.  The tradeoff  between  investment  and  consumption  changes
after  loans  are  disbursud:  while  ex-ante,  the  country  prefers  to
promise  to invest  in  order  to secure  larger  loans,  ex-post,  the
incentive  to invest  will  be limited  by the  scarcity  of liquidity.  Of
course,  creditors  realize  this  and  limit  the  amount  of lending  such
the  ex-post  optimal  investment  and  consumption  decisions  do  not
violate  any  creditworthiness  considerations.  This  can lead  to foregone
investment  opportunities  as creditors  are  not  willing  to provide  any
new loans  which,  as they  correctly  perceive,  could  partly  be used  to
finance  current  consumption.  In this  context,  a precommitment
technology  could  reduce  disincentives  and  lead  to  efficiency  gains.  In
fact,  if this  precommitment  technology  were  available  to them,  the
debtor  as  well  as the  creditors  could  use  it to  their  advantage  in
constructing  their  offers,  as it  would  allow  them  to increase  to their
advaniage  the  size  of the  economic  pie.16
In  what follows,  we show  that  the  ability  to  make  offers  in terms
of a triplet  (L,D,I)  will  allow  debtor  and  creditors  to increase  their
payoff.  The exact  division  of the  efficiency  gains  depends  on,  among
others,  the  bargaining  position  of the  debtor  and  the  creditors,  and
the  objectives  of the  provider  of the  precommitment  technology.  The
interpretation  of the  precommitment  technology,  e.g.,  conditional
16  Sachs  (1989)  and  Aizenman  and  Borenszstein  (1989)  also  discuss  the
benefit  of a precommitment  technology.-21-
loans,  and  how and  when it  must  be associated  with  debt  relief  in
order  to  make  provision  of the  commitment  technology  financially
viable,  is discussed  in the  section  4 of the  paper.
3.1  The  Debtor's  Optimal  Offer
Using  the  precommitment  technology,  the  debtor  is  able to  make  an
offer  over (D,L,I)  that  maximizes  his  utility  while  leaving  the
creditors  at their  status-quo  payoff  of E.  Since  the  debtor  commits  to
an investment  level  I, the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  only
requires  that  the  debtor  be creditworthy  in the  second  period,  i.e.,
(10)  E+f(I)>D.
The  debtor  will of  course  only  make  offers  that  make  him  better
off  than  his  status-quo  welfare  level  U(E).  17
The  effect  of the  precommitment  technology  is  to replace  the  time
consistency  constraint  (7)  by the  less  demanding  constraint  that  the
debtor  is  better  off  investing  I**  and  repaying  D**,  where  **  denotes
optimal  amounts,  than  getting  his  status-quo  welfare  W0-U(E).  The
constraint  (7)  becomes:
(7')  D <  E +  f(I)  - [U(E)/b]  +  [U(E-I+L)/b]  - DP"(I,L)
17  Note  that  strictly  speaking  the  reservation  utility  under
precommitment  is  U(E)  and  not  U(E+L)  as  under  the  no precommitment
case,  as the  offer  does  not  have  to satisfy  the  time  consistency
constraint.  It  would  be logical,  however,  to impose  the  condition  that
the  debtor  will  not  make  offers  using  the  precommitment  technology
will  which  result  in a lower  welfare  level  than  offers  without
precommitment.  This  point  was  also  raised  by the  discussant,  Guillermo
Calvo.  See  further  his  comments.-22-
The creditworthiness  cor.straint  (10)  requires  that  D:E+f(I).
Equation  (10)  and (7')  together  imply  that  when  U(E)<U(E+L-I)  equation
(10)  will  be the  most  binding  constraint  and that  when  U(E)>U(E+L-I)
equation  (7')  will  be the  most  binding  constraint.  As we had  assumed
that  the  debtor  had a  high liquidity  preference,  his  optimal  offer
will satisfy  U(E)<U(E+L-I),  implying  that  equation  (10)  will  be the
most  binding  constraint  for  the  optimization  problem.  Using  the  fact
that  the  creditors'  payoff  P is  equal  to  E-D-L  (equation  (8)),  the
restriction  (10)  can  be further  modified  to  f(I)2L. The  problem  to
solve  becomes  then:
Max  W-U(E-I+L)+b[E+f(I)-(E+L)]
L,I
s.t. (10)  E+f(I)2D  (or  equivalently  f(I)2L)
Denoting  by n the  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the
constraint  (10)  the  first  order  conditions  yield:
(11)  U'(E+L**-I**)-(b+n)f'(I**)-b+n
This  implies  that  f'(I**)-l.  In  terms  of figure  1, the  debtor
chooses  its  preferred  offer  on the  line  (8)  subject  to the  allocation
being  below  the  line  (10).  When  equation  (10)  is  binding  (n>O),  L**
will  be equal  to f(I**)  and  D**  will  be equal  to  E+f(I**),  implying
that  the  debtor's  second  period  consumption  will  be zero  as all
resources  go to service  the  debt  and  that  first  period  consumption
will  be above  E as L**-f(I**)>I**.  In this  case,  the  debtor,  using  the
precommitment  technology,  prefers  to  transfer  resources  to the  first
period,  which  would  be in  his interest  if  he had  a  high liquidity
preference,  something  which  we assume  is the  case.  The  optimal  offer
will therefore  be at E with  equation  (10)  binding. 18-23-
The solution  will certainly  be a  Pareto  improvement  over the
status-quo  allocation.  More importantly,  if  accepted,  the  offer
(I**,L**,D**)  can  yield  a  welfare  level  for  the  debtor  which  is  higher
than  the  welfare  level  that  can  be achieved  with  his  best offer
without  an investment  precommitment.  The  effect  of the  precommitment
technology  is to  allow  the  debtor  to commit  to  a  higher  investment  in
exchange  for  a larger  loan.  To keep  creditors  as  well off,  the  optimal
offer  will also  involve  a one-to-one  larger  debt  repayment.  Thus,  the
debtor  gain  is the  net  return  (above  the  world  interest  rate)  on
investment  projects  that  would  not  have  been  undertaken  without  the
use  of the  precommitment  technology  and  the  higher  availability  of
current  liquidity.1 9
3.2  The Creditors'  ORtimal  Offer
Equipped  with  a precommitment  mechanism,  the  creditors  can  make
an offer  of the  form  (D**,L**,I**)  which  involves  an offer  of D and  L
and  includes  the  debtor  to  precommit  to  a certain  investment  level  I.
It  will  be in the  creditors  best interests  to  structure  the  offer  so
as to leave  the  debtor  at its  status-quo  w-lfare  level  W0-U(E). 20
18  It is  also  possible  that  the  credit  ceiling  (10)  does  not  bind.
Then,  n=O,  and  U'=b.  In this  case,  debt  replyment  does  not  consume  all
of future  output  as the  debtor  does  not  borrow  all  that  is  available.
19  However,  not  all  feasible  allocations  with  a precommitment
technology  yield  a  higher  welfare  level  for  the  debtor  than  under  no
precommitment  technology:  the  effective  reservation  utility  of the
debtor  under  no precommitment  was  U(E+L*)  while  here it is  U(E).
Assuming  that  the  debtor  will  not  use  the  precommitment  technology  (or
the  provider  of the  technology  refuses  the  use  of it)  in  constructing
its  offer  if it  does  not  benefit  the  debtor,  the  reservation  utility
would  be U(E+L*)  and  the  set  of feasible  allocations  would  be somewhat
smaller.
20  However,  the  debtor  could  refuse  such  an  offer  since  he can  secure
a larger  payoff  U(E+L*)  if the  precommitment  technology  was  not  used.
It is  possible  to show  that  the  creditors  can  design  offers  with
precommitment  that  leave  the  debtor  as  well  off  as offers  that  do not-24-
Creditors  maximize  their  net  payoff  over the  choices  of D,  L and
I subject  to  keeping  the  debtor  at least  equally  well off  and  a
creditworthiness  constraint,  i.e.,
Max  P-D-L
L,I,D
s.t. (10)  E+f(I)2D
and  (7')  U(E+L-I)+b[E+f(I)-D]2U(E)
The  first  order  conditions  for  this  maximization  problem  imply
that  creditors'  optimal  choice  of investment  I**  is  such  that
f'(I**)-l.  The  creditors  maximize  the  returns  from  investments  using
the  international  cost  of capital  as the  opportunity  cost.  In effect,
they  run  the  country.  As a result,  the  investment  level  will  be higher
than  that  achieved  under  the  no-commitment  offer  (but  equal  to the
investment  level  achieved  with the  debtor's  offer  under  the
precommitment  case).  Equation  (7')  will  certainly  be  binding  as the
debtor  will  be left  with  a  utility  level  of  U(E).  Thus,  the  preferred
offer  will  be on the  curve  (7')  in figure  1.  With  a strong  preference
for  liquidity  (10)  will  also  be binding,  resulting  in  the (corner-
solution)  optimal  offer  represented  by point  H. In this  case,  the
creditors  will set  L-I**  and  D**-E+f(I**).  The  debtor  is  as well  off
as without  an offer  but  worse  off  than  under  the  offer  without  a
precommitment  technology.  Thus,  the  precommitment  technology  in this
context  hurts  the  debtor  but  profits  the  creditors.  Note that
potentially,  if Do  is  not  too  large,  debt  does  not  need  to  be written
off.
include  a  precommitment.-25-
3-3  3b& Multiplicity  Qt Efficient  Allocations
The  outcome  of the  interactions  between  the  creditors  and  the
debtor  will not  necessarily  produce  an allocation  that  correspond  to a
unilateral  offer;  rather,  the  equilibrium  chosen  would  be the  result
of bargaining  process  between  the  debtor  and  the  creditors  and,
potentially,  the  provider  of the  precommitment  technology.  For  this
purpose  it  will  be useful  to first  describe  the  new  set  of feasible
allocations.
In  Figure  1, the  contract  curve  with  precommitment  is  depicted  as
segment  HE.  This represents  the  set  of all  efficient  allocations
(D,L,I)  for  which  improving  one's  side  welfare  necessarily  requires
hurting  the  other  party.  Thesa  are  first  best  allocations  since  all
profitable  investment  projects  are  undertaken.  At H, the  debtor  is
equally  off  as at the  status-quo  allocation  as  all  the  efficiency
gains  are  collected  by the  creditors.  On the  other  hand,  at E, the
debtor  is  better  off  than  in all  previous  allocations  as  he gets  all
the  new  efficiency  gains.  The  other  allocations  represent  all  other
ways of sharing  the  economic  pie  with  precommitment.
3.4  Weak and  Strong  Debt  Overhangs
Depending  on whether  debt  write-offs  are  necessary  to achieve
efficient  allocations  with investment  precommitment,  we can  classify
situations  of  debt  overhang  into  two  broad  types,  a  weak and  a strong
form.  This  classification  depends  on  who's  point  of  view is  being-26-
addressed,  the  debtor  or the  creditors.  We  will  address  this  issue
from  the  point  of  view  of the  creditors,  as the  creditors  always
prefer  less  write-offs,  and  define  the  set  of  extreme  cases  where  in
spite  of the  commitment  technology  being  used  to their  sole  advantage,
the  creditors  coalition  still  need  to  write-off  debt.
We will  define  a  debt  overhang  as a situation  in  which  the
provision  of liquidity,  without  any  precommitments,  is  not  sufficient
to  restore  creditworthiness  and  lead  to  full  repayment.  For  a debtor
country  experiencing  a debt  overhang,  debt  reduction  will  be necessary
in the  absence  of a  commitment  technology.  In terms  of figure  1, a
debtor  with  outstanding  debt  before  new  loans  are  advanced  above  point
Y will  be perceived  by creditors  to  have  a debt  overhang.  In effect,  Y
corresponds  to Dmax(L*),  the  maximum  repayment  next  period  given  the
optimal  amount  of loans  L* without  precommitments.  Whenever  Do  is
above  Y the  creditors  best  offer  is represented  by point  F in figure  1
and  includes  new  loans  (i.e,  L*oO).  All  other  feasible  offers  on line
(7)  yield  smaller  payoffs  to  the  creditors.  In order  for  total  debt
outstanding  -after  the  new loan  L*  has  been  advanced-  to satisfy  the
creditworthiness  constraint,  it  can  not  exceed  Dm¶(L*)  and
outstanding  debt  above  that  must  be written  off.
It is  aasy  to show  that  the  existence  of  a precommitment
technology  can  transform  the  situation  of some  debtor  countries
experiencing  a debt  overhang  into  a situation  of a overhang  that  does
not  necessarily  require  a debt  write  off  to attain  an efficient
allocation.  This  leads  us to the  following  classification  of debtors:
(i) Weak  debt  overhang
When  outstanding  debt  is large  enough  to  create  a debt  overhang-27-
but  not  too  large,  the  status-quo  allocation  can  be improved  upon
using  the  precommitment  technology  without  a reduction  in  the
contractual  debt  obligation.  In figure  1, this  correspond  to the
situation  where  inherited  debt  DO is  below  point  X. The  availability
of new  loans  L**  which  are  conditioned  on an investment  level  I**  can
induce  sufficient  investment  to restore  creditworthiness  and  to raise
the  value  of the  outstanding  as  well  as the  new  debt to  par.
(ii)  Strong  debt  overhang
Inherited  debt  is so large  that  the  status-quo  low  equilibrium
allocation  is  preferred  by the  debtor  unless  debt  is  written  off.  In
this  case,  it is impossible  to  use the  precommitment  technology  to
anybody's  benefit  unless  the  creditors  reduce  the  contractual
obligation  of their  claims.  This  corresponds  to  a situation  with
inherited  debt  above  point  X in  figure  1.  In this  case,  we  have seen
that  only  when  the  creditors  give  an  upfront  debt  write-off  will the
debtor  be interested  tn regain  creditworthiness  and increase  the  value
of the  outstanding  debt.-28-
4. Implications  for  Conditionality  and  Multilateral  Lending
As various  multilateral  lending  institutions  provide  conditional
loans  to countries  with  conditions  over  micro  and  macro  economic
aspects  of public  policy,  it  is logical  to think  of the  provider  of
the  precommitment  technology  as a  multilateral.  The  ability  of the
multilaterals  to  provide  precommitments,  "conditionality",  is derived
from  their  capacities  in terms  of  economic  analysis,  their  long  term
relations  with the  countries  and  from  their  status  as international
organizations.  The  precommitment  technology  is  made  operational
through  making  the  multilateral's  own  disbur-ements  conditional  on
policy  actions,  through  linking  other  lenders'  financing  and
disbursements  to the  multilateral's  own  actions  and, in  general,
through  the  long  term  relationship  with  the  country.
The influence  of the  multilateral  goes  often  beyond  the  exact
amount  of the  resources  it  provides  and  covers  larger  parts  of the
public  sector  influence  on the  economy,  as for  instance  in the  World
Bank's  Structural  Adjustment  Lending.  Furthermore,  the  multilaterals
can  provile  guarantees  to  other  creditors,  which  in this  context,  can
act  as one-to-one  substitutes  for  its  own  lending.
For the  multilaterals  to  be able  to finance  their  operations,
they  must  earn  some  fair  rate  of raturn  on their  loans.  This  can  be a
very  difficult  task  in  times  of  a debt  crisis  with  a literal
evaporation  of  voluntary  private  finance  for  the  most  highly  indebted
countries.  However,  injections  of liquidity  can  only  be made
profitable  by the  multilaterals  conditionality  in  cases  of  weak  debt
overhang.  One  could  expect  that  the  injection  of liquidity  coupled
with  conditions  on  good  economic  policy  will  solve  the  credit-
worthiness  crisis  by increasing  output  sufficiently.  In these  cases,-29-
by providing liquidity against an accepted commitment to an investment
program, the multilateral creates efficiency gains that are large
enough to get a debtor to regain its credit-worthiness.  21  In fact, the
exact amount of the loan is not important. Conditioning on amounts of
"investment" that go beyond the amount of the multilateral loan
provides enough incentives for other creditors to lend.
But in cases of strong overhang, an injection of liquidity by a
multilateral institution  will not help as the economic investment
incentives will still be lacking; when all is done, the economic pie
will not be larger as the new liquidity  will be used mainly to finance
consumption. In other words, a true conditional lending program is
unacceptable to the debtor. If the  multilateral is granted seniority
rights over the other creditors, it  will however accept to inject some
liquidity, but that could not be in the form of a conditional loan, as
the debtor would not accept it. In that case, the old creditors will
end up with the total payoff for all creditors minus the amount of new
senior loans by the multilateral.
Therefore, in situations of strong debt overhang, the
multilateral cannot enforce an efficient allocation using conditional
loans unless the old debt obligation is reduced. The relative lack of
conditional lending  programs in the least credit-worthy countries can
thus be rationalized given the (past)  unwillingness of creditors to
grant debt relief. In those cases, a return to credit-worthiness is
impossible  without either some form of debt relief or very favorable
external developments (terms of trade, interest  rates). In a situation
21  Another way to make injections of liquidity  by multilaterals
profitable is for the debtors to grant some form of seniority to
multilateral loans. However, in cases of weak overhang, this is not
necessary if conditionality  works and leads to creditworthiness. In
general, seniority rights are more meaningfully analyzed in the
context of a model of lending under uncertainty.-30-
of strong  debt  overhang,  lending  (a  large  part  of) the  necessary
liquidity  L*  by a  multilateral  and  associated  conditioning  on
investment  level,  combined  with  debt  relief  by other  creditors  can  be
an overall  efficient  solution.  The  old  creditors  might  be unwilling  to
provide  (all)  the  new liquidity  necessary  to  make the  efficiency  gains
feasible  (L*)  given  factors  like  uncertainty  and  constraints  on their
capital.  However,  they  might  be willing  to  write  down their  debt,
contingent  upon  assurances  regarding  adjustment  and  investment,  to the
level  D* minus  the  new loans  provided  by the  multilateral,  L*,  i.e.,
to  D*-L*.  The  multilateral  will  then  collect  a sufficient  part  of the
efficiency  gains  to assure  a return  of L*.  The  other  creditors  net
payoff  will  remain  the  same,  P-D*-L*,  as in  the  case in  which  they
themselves  provided  the  liquidity,  but  they  have  avoided  putting  up
any  new  liquidity.  The  write-off  is  a necessity  as the  multilateral
will  not  be able  to "sell"  its  conditionality  without  a debt  write-
off.
The  existence  of externalities  can  play  an important  factor  for
the  multilateral  in terms  of  how to  distribute  the  associated
efficiency  gains  over  the  debtor  country  and  the  creditors.  The  most
important  external  factors  that  can influence  the  preference  of the
multilaterals  regarding  the  division  of the  efficiency  gains  they  help
create  are:  a preference  for  a stable  international  financial  system;
a preference  for  growth  in  the  debtor  countries  and  for  larger  world
trade;  and  some  preferences  induced  by the  geo-political  objectives  of
its  members.  Considerations  regarding  the  stability  of the
international  financial  system  would  presumably  lead  the  multilateral
to  diride  the  efficiency  gains  associated  with its  technology  more
towards  the  creditors  (i.e.,  towards  point  H in  Figure  1).  On the-31-
other  hand,  the  preference  for  growth  and  for  efficient  world  trade
provides  the  multilateral  with incentives  to agree  to  a division  of
the  efficiency  gains  in  a way  that  is  compatible  with  a rapid
resolution  of the  bargaining  deadlock.  This is  because,  in the  absence
of a coordinated  debt  relief,  countries  with  a large  debt  overhang
will  get  stuck  in a low  growth  situation.  Moreover,  they  will  tend  to
opt  for  a less  open  trade  regime  to reduce  the  impact  of  penalties
imposed  by creditors  (for  instance  in the  form  of  cutoffs  of trade
financing).  Finally,  the  governments  of the  creditor  countries  share
the  responsibilities  for  the  resolution  of problems  in  highly  indebted
countries  not  only  because  their  policies  regarding  the  debt  problems
can  be in the  economic  interest  of their  countries  but,  more
importantly,  because  their  policies  can  serve  their  geo-political
interests.  The  multilateral  might  have to  reflect  these  geo-political
interest  in  the  design,  and  associated  division,  of the  efficiency
gains  of its  precommitment  technology.  Further  research  will  have  to
include  the  externalities  associated  with  a debt  overhang  to  evaluate
whether  the  actions  of  parties  involved  are  also  "socially",  in  terms
of  maximizing  world  welfare.
As a result,  one  can  argue  that  the  multilateral  will  set  the
following  conditions  for  the  use  of its  technology:  i) its  own
financial  concerns  are  taken  care  off,  and/or  its  fixed  costs  of
developing  and  maintaining  the  conditionality  technology  are
recovered;  ii)  the  negative  externalities  are  handled  in  an
appropriate  fashion;  and  iii)  the  remaining  gains,  if  any,  of the
technology  are  properly  and/or  fairly  divided.-32-
5.  Conclusions
The  paper  has shown  that  a precommitment  technology  can lead  to
substantial  efficiency  gains  in  the  context  of a debt  overhang.  For
some  countries,  the  existence  of a  precommitment  technology  can  be
sufficient  to avoid  all  future  debt  writeoffs.  In  general,  the
existence  of a precommitment  technology  leads  to  efficiency  gains.  The
exact  division  of the  larger  pie  will  depend  on the  strategic
interactions  between  the  debtor  and  creditors,  but,  more importantly,
on the  objectives  of the  provider  of the  precommitment  technology.
The  paper  can  be used  as a starting  point  to  study  the
implications  of  uncertainty  and  asymmetric  information  on the  outcome
of bargaining  between  debtor  and  creditors  and  its  implications  for
more  efficient  strategies.  This  would  allow  a further  analysis  of the
difficulties  in the  implementation  of efficient  debt  write-offs  in
cases  of strong  overhang  and  the  explanation  of the  current  strategy
of  muddling  through  as a pooling  equilibrium.  Various  financial  tools
used  by creditors  and  debtors  which,  at first  face  value,  do  not  seem
to generate  financial  benefits,  might  then  be explained  in terms  of
providing  some  screening  and  signalling  benefits.  The  analysis  can
then  be used to  evaluate  the  effects  of  market  based  transactions  by
the  debtor  or by outside  investors,  e.g.,  debt  buybacks,  debt
conversions  and  deb-equity  swaps,  on the  efficiency  of the
equilibrium. 22
A further  important  issue  is in some  sense  the  time-consistency
of the  model  in  this  paper  itself:  if  creditors  and  debtors  had this
precommitment  technology  at their  disposable  all  along,  why did  they
22  See  Diwan  and  Claessens  (1989)  for  further  work  along  these  lines.-33-
not  use it  and  "prevent"  some  forms  of  debt  overhang?  The technology
can  after  all  generate,  as the  paper  shows,  efficiency  gains  even in  a
situation  of no debt  overhang  as it alleviates  the  time  consistency
constraint.  However,  the  reconciliation  of the  ex-post  and  ex-ante
optimality  of this  model,  and  of  models  in  general,  might  require  a
more  powerful  framework.-34-
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"CONDITIONALITY  AND  DEBT  RELIEF,"
by S. Claessens  and  I.  Diwan
A Comment  by Guillermo  A. Calvo,
January,  1989
I.  Introduction
This  is a  nice  paper  that  puts together  several  crucial  aspects  of
the  so-called  debt  problem. Prominent  among  those  in  the  possibility
that  the  debt  overhang  prevents  the  world  from  attaining  a Pareto
optimum  allocation.
The  debt-overhang  problem  appears  to  have  been  first  noticed  in
writing  by Sachs  (1986). The theme  was  later  explored  by many
authors: Corden,  Dooley,  Froot,  Krugman,  Helpman,  to  name  just  a few.
A  central  message  of this  literature  is that  spontaneous  market  forces
may  not  be able  to lead  the  system  to a Pareto  optimum,  unless  lenders
are  persuaded  to  work as a  block.
The  main  novelty  of the  present  paper  is  that  it  complicates  the
usual  story  in  a relevant  way  by assuming  that  the  borrower  can  cheat
(or,  in the  paper's  language,  that  the  borrower  can  be time
inconsistent  due  to  his inability  to  precommit).  This  has the
interesting  implication  that  the  Pareto  optimum  solution  may  not  be
attainable  even  when the  lenders  are  able  to overcome  their  free-rider
problem,  simply  because  the  borrower  cannot  make  credible  commitments.
Thus,  the  paper  reaches  the  important  conclusion  that  a precommitment
technology  may  be as  crucial  for  Pareto  optimality  as the  above-
mentioned  coordination  among  lenders. One  way to  obtain  precommitment
on the  part  of the  borrower  is to  subject  him to (credible)  third--37-
party  type  loan  conditionality.  The  authors,  however,  do not
elaborate  on  how to  make  conditionality  stick.  . .who  will bell  the
cat,  as it  were.  Nevertheless,  the  paper  has identified  a crucial
ingredient  in the  solution  of the  debt  problem.
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I find  myself  in  almost  complete  agreement  with the  results  of the
paper,  although  I feel  that  some  of them  need  a  more  careful
qualification.  Since  the  central  issues  are  important,  I  will,  first
present  an alternative  simpler  model  that  captures  the  main  features
of the  Claessens-Diwan  (C-D)  paper. Then,  I  will  discuss  some  of
their  central  results,  and  show  new  ones  inspired  by their  framework.
Section  3  closes  these  comments  with some  general  remarks.
II. A Simple  Model
The  whole  action  occurs  "tomorrow."  Output  tomorrow  is  a function
of investment  today;  the  production  function  is  f(N),  where  N stands
for  "new  money." For  the  sake  of dramatic  effects,  I  will  assume  that
f(O)-O,  i.e.,  no new  money,  no output. Otherwise,  f is as  usual
assumed  to  be strictly  increasing  and  concave. New  money,  N, is lent
only  if it receives  the  international  interest  rate  r.  Therefore,  if
the  borrower  takes  the  loan  N and  employs  it to invest,  his  net income
tomorrow  will  be
(1)  f(N)  - (l+r)N  - D
23  The sovereign-country  debt  literature  before  the  current  debt
crises  put  the  possibility  of cheating  at the  center  stage  (see  Eaton,
Gersovitz  and  Stiglitz  (1986)). This  feature  was  later  somewhat
downplayed  in the  discussion  of lenders-coordination  problems. The
present  paper  can,  therefore,  be seen  as a recognition  that  the  ideas
that  helped  to  explain  why Pareto  optimality  could  not  be attained
with free  international  loans  are  also  relevant  for  understanding  why
the  debt  crisis  could  be deeper  than  a  neoclassical  economist  would  be
led  to  believe.-38-
where  D denotes  initial  debt. This  curve  is  represented  in Figure  1
for  different  initial  debt  levels. Notice  that  these  curves  peak  at
the  Pareto  optimal  point,  P,  at which  the  gross  marginal  productivity
of capital,  f',  equals  the  interest  rate  factor  (l+r).
Let  us  now  consider  the  case  in  which  if the  debtor  is  bankrupt,
i.e.,  if expression  (1)  is  negative,  ther.  every  creditor  gets  repaid
in  proportion  to  his  claims. In  other  words,  if (1)  is  negative,  we
assumed  that  new-money  lenders  get
(2)  f(N)*(l+r)N  /  [(l+r)N+D)
while  the  difference  goes  to the  holders  of the  original  debt
documents. We refer  to  this  as the  "equal-sharing"  system.
It follows  immediately  that  under  the  equal-sharing  system,  no new
money  will  be forthcoming  if D  =  D" as depicted  in  Figure  1.  This
corresponds  to  what the  authors  call  a "strong"  debt  overhang. On the
other  hand,  if D  D',  new  money  will  be lent  if the  money  is invested
(and  a gunboat  technology,  like  in  C-D,  ensures  repayment).  This is
the  case  of a "weak"  debt  overhang.
As mentioned  earlier,  C-D  assume,  in addition,  that  the  borrower
can  cheat  by consuming  or squandering  the  new  money,  so gunboats  or
not  the  proceeds  of the  new  money  become  irretrievably  lost  for  the
lender. Figure  1  depicts  two  different  cheating  technologies,  denoted
cheat-l  and  cheat-2. Each  of these  curves  shows  the  net  output  that
could  be secured  by the  borrower  if  he does  not invest  the  new  money
and  employs  it,  say,  for  consumption.  Hence,  if  cheat-2  is the
relevant  function,  the  borrower  would  be unable  to  obtain  any  new-39-
money  even  J  the  weak-overhang  situation. This is  so,  because
cheating  always  yields  higher  utility  than  investing  and  paying  back
the  competitive  interest  rate. Under  these  circumstances,  equilibrium
net income  is  zero  for  the  borrower,  and  the  original  debt  is fully
repudiated.
The advantages  of a third  party  that  eliminates  cheating
opportunities  in  weak-overhang  situation  with  a cheat-2  technology  are
clear. For,  such  an arrangement  would  automatically  assure  that  P
units  of  new  money  will  be borrowed,  thus  ensuring  Pareto  optimality,
positive  net income  for  the  borrower,  and  full  repayment  of  debts. No
doubt,  the  magic  wand  of conditionality  (or,  rather,  precommitment)
works  wonders  in this  case! This is  one  of the  central  and,
certainly,  one  of the  most  dramatic  results  of the  paper.
A third  party  may  not  be necessary  if the  cheating  technology  is
below  cheat-l;  for,  if N-P  then  there  would  be no incentives  to  cheat.
The importance  of this  observation  will  become  apparent  after  we
discuss  the  strong-overhang  case.
Suppose  now that  D=D"  and  the  economy  is,  therefore,  in  a strong-
overhang  situation. Obviously,  under  the  equal-sharing  system,
cheating  does  not  help  getting  out  of the  low-level  equilibrium.  As
noted  by the  authors,  however,  debt  relief  can  help to  get  to a Pareto
superior  situation. For  example,  if lenders  forgive  D"-D'  and
cheating  is  prevented,  then,  as noted  above,  all  the  characters  in
this  play get  positive  payoffs.
Suppose  that  lenders  move first  and  that  they  unilaterally  decide
the  amount  of debt  relief. The  debtor  moves  second  and  chooses  N,
subject  of his  being  able  to  make  credible  repayment  promises.24-40-
Obviously,  if  cheating  could  be prevented,  the  original  lenders  would
grant  the  minimum  debt  relief  consistent  with  positive  repayment  of
the  original  debt.  In terms  of Figure  1, the  latter  implies  lowering
debt  obligations  from  D" to  Dc (c  for  "critical").  Suppose  now that
cheating  is  possible  and  that  the  relevant  technology  is  cheat-i.
Clearly,  under  these  circumstances,  debt  has  to fall  to  at lea3t  Dc'.
If  debt  relief  is  D"-Dc,  Pareto  Optimality  is  not  achieved  because  the
only  level  of new  money  which  will  lead  to  cheating  is  Nc'. 25
However,  the  borrower  is  better  off  when  cheating  is  possible. This
shows  the  possibility  that  a third  party  ma  tilt  th  scales  against  a
debtor  country  by imposing  credible  conditionality.  This is  an
important  point  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  paper,  and  which  seems
to  have  been somewhat  missed  by the  debt  literature  (see,  however,
Calvo  (1989)).
In  the  C-D  paper  it is  further  assumed  that  the  original  lenders
can  also  determine  the  amount  of  new  money,  N.  Results,  however,  are
basically  the  same. Thus,  for  example,  with  no precommitment  and  a
cheat-I  technology,  one  can  easily  show  that  equilibrium  debt  relief
will  be, as  before,  D"-Dc',  and  new  money  will  be Nc'<P.
C-D  confine  themselves  to the  equal-sharing  system. However,  in
practice,  the  actual  system  does  not  seem  to  have  developed  entirely
that  way.  Countries  have  been  able  to  borrow  from  international
institutions  and  to issue  bonds  denominated  in  domestic  currency,  and
which  are  not  subject  to the  same  cross-default  clauses  as
international  debt. World  Bank  loans,  for  example,  appear  to  have
24  The  consequences  of changing  this  assumption  will  be discussed  in
tpe  next  paragraph.
For  the  sake  of definiteness,  we assume  that  in  case  of
indifference  the  borrower  decides  not  to cheat.-41-
enjoyed  de  facto  seniority  over  private  debt  in several  recent  cases.
If initial  debt  is subordinated  to  new  money,  in the  sense  that
the  latter  gets  paid first,  then  Pareto  optimality  could  always  be
guaranteed  if  cheating  can  be  prevented. For  the  sake  of
definiteness,  imagine  that  the  original  debt  is  D",  so the  economy
suffers  from  a case  of strong  debt  overhang. The  following
proposition  can  be shown: with  no debt  relief  and  credible
conditionality  the  country's  net  income  is  zero  while  (giving  marginal
incentives  to the  debtor),  the  original-debt  holders  could  secure
themselves  Dc.  This  shows  that  senioritv-cum-conditionality  n.ew  money
r-a_y  put  debtors  in a  situation  which  Js  worse  than  if tJhY  and  their
creditors  were left  free to their  own  devices. Therefore,  if  cheating
is  not  possible,  debt  subordination  may lot  be to the  advantage  of the
debtor,  unless  it comes  together  with  sufficient  debt  relief.
However,  debt  subordination  could  be attractive  if it  was a
subterfuge  to actually  force  debt  relief  beyond  Dc,  or even  beyond
Dc'.  It is  my impression  that  some  countries  that  could  have
benefitted  from  the  equal-sharing  system  are  issuing  a sizable  amount
of domestic  bonds,  and  have  been fully  servicing  them,  even  when at
the  same  time  their  foreign  debt  has  at  best  been  only  partially
serviced. Hence,  these  countries  may  actually  be in  a situation  in
which  foreign  debt  is subordinated  to  domestic  debt. Why  would  they
do that? A possible  explanation  is that,  contrary  to our  working
hypothesis,  some  of these  new-debt  transactions  do  not increase  net
indebtedness  of the  country  as  a whole. For  example,  government  could
borrow  from  the  domestic  private  sector  in  order  to  make transfers  to
the  domestic  private  sector. Social  welfare  in  the  debtor  country  is,-42-
in  principle,  not  affected  by this  transaction.  However,  if  domestic
lenders  get  paid  first,  this  amounts  to  a de facto  repudiation  of the
old  debt.  This  possibility  is  not  considered  in the  C-D  paper,  and is
ruled  out in  our  previous  analysis  because  there  we implicitly  netted
out  domestic  obligations.  I think  analysis  of this  debt-repudiation
mechanism,  which  provides  a rationale  for  the  apparently  heavier
reliance  on domestic  debt  on the  part  of debtor  countries,  deserves
further  attention.
III.  Final  Remarks
The  paper  by Claessens  and  Diwan  has  brought  to the  surface  the
simple,  but  deep,  economics  of debt  relief  and  conditionality  (or,
more  generally,  precommitment).  The  message  of their  paper  is  that
conditionality  helps.  I  agree,  and  I  disagree.
I agree  because  some  form  of  precommitment  always  dominates
discretion. However,  I  disagree  because  precommitment  may  reduce  the
country's  bargaining  power  and,  in some  cases,  lower  a debtor  country
welfare.
A question  the  C-D  paper  does  not  answer  is,  why did  we end  up
where  we are  now?  Rational  lenders  (and  I suppose  they  would  not
accept  any  other  adjective)  could  not  possibly  have envisioned  a
situation  where  lenders  and  borrowers  could  be  better  off  by just
redefining  the  loan  contract. Otherwise,  this  would  have already
happened,  and  we (the  intellectuals  "we")  would  not  be spending  any
time  on this  case.
Sachs  (1988)  has  an explanation:  creditors  may  be waiting  for
somebody--e.g.,  the  taxpayers  body--to  bail  them  out.  This  sounds-43-
reasonable. It  could  explain  why  banks  are  so reluctant  to move  a
finger,  and  why they  appear  to  be so  belligerent  about  debt-relief
strategies  which  do not  involve  the  active  participation  of the
taxpayer. My comments  suggest  that,  in addition,  the  present
stalemate  may  also  be due  to the  banks'  expectations  that  old  debt
could  be subordinated  to new  debt  cum  conditionality,  since  I  have
shown  that  such  an arratigement  may  be preferable  for  the  banks  to a
market-based  solution.
In the  final  analysis,  the  debt  problem  is a situation  in  which,
as a general  rule,  it is  not  feasible  to  honor  previous  debt
commitments. Furthermore,  the  C-D type  model  shows  that  efficient
outcomes  are  not  unique,  and  that,  essentially,  borrower  and  lender
are  involved  in  a classical  bargaining  situation,  the  outcome  of  which
depends,  quite  naturally,  on the  relative  bargaining  power  of the  two
sides. Consequently,  the  active  participation  of outsiders--i.e.,
third  parties--will  tilt  the  scales  in  one  direction  or the  other,  and
the  C-D  model  shows  that  the  way scales  are  tilted  may  depend  on  very
subtle  mechanics.
An important  observation  that  emerges  from  this  paper's  analysis
is,  therefore,  that  third  parties  ought  to  have  a somewhat  clear
notion  of  what corresponds  to a "fair"  distribution  of  wealth  between
borrowers  and  lenders. My own  suggestion  is to  try  to extricate  the
corresponding  "implicit  contracts"  from  actual  debt  agreements,  so  as
to  help to enforce  the  spirit  rather  than  the  letter  of these
contracts. Thus,  for  example,  debt  contracts  during  the  1970's
exhibited  a small  but  nonetheless  positive  spread  over  L.I.B.O.R.,
which  appears  to  exceed  loan  administration  costs  by a comfortable
margin. Therefore,  if  lenders  are  risk  neutral,  such  a spread  could
be interpreted  as  an insurance  premium  against  less  than  full.44-
repayment,  and  we can  thus  argue  that  debt  relief  was  contemplated  in
the  original  contract. The  problem  now is to  find  out  under  what
conditions  debt  relief  was expected  and,  of  course,  how  much. 26
26  For  a further  discussion  of these  issues,  see  Calvo  (1987).-45-
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